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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(j). 
H. DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
None. 
III. STATEMENT OF CASE 
The following colloquy between the trial court and counsel for Appellant D&K 
Management ("D&K") summarizes the true posture of this case: 
THE COURT: There are no facts left unless you identify some for me, and 
that is one of my questions for you. 
COUNSEL FOR D&K: Okay. 
THE COURT: No facts left that determine possession, are there? Only the 
damages that result from forfeiture of staying in possession? 
COUNSEL FOR D&K: I would agree with your Honor that, given the 
Court's ruling, there are no facts left - no facts left that have to be decided. 
There were no facts initially with this motion for summary judgment. 
(Emphasis added.) 
THE COURT: Uh-huh, (affirmative). 
COUNSEL FOR D&K: But given this ruling, there are no facts that have 
to be decided for possession. However there are a number of facts and 
there are certainly issues that remain with regard to their damages. 
(Emphasis added). 
THE COURT: Oh, I agree with that. 
(H'rg Tr., 4:24-5:11, May 26, 2004; R. 999; attached hereto as Exhibit A.) 
This exchange took place following remand from this Court in IHC Health 
Services, Inc. v. D&K Management, 2003 UT 5 ("D&KF). It demonstrates D&K's 
concession to the trial court: there are no material disputed facts in this case. The 
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exchange took place during a hearing on finality of judgment for Rule 54(b) certification. 
The trial court had been pressing D&K to explain exactly what facts, if any, remained 
undetermined. Unable to avoid the trial court's direct exploration of D&K's claims, 
counsel was forced to concede that there really are no facts which are undisputed. 
Accordingly, the trial court affirmed its decision to grant summary judgment in favor of 
IHC Health Services ("IHC") on the issue of whether D&K forfeited its lease with IHC 
(hereafter the "Lease"). (Order, Jan. 23. 2006; R. 1370-74.) 
In this appeal, though, D&K abandons the candor with which it addressed the trial 
court. It now insists that a trial was warranted, even though it conceded to the trial court 
there were no disputed material facts. (Appellant's Br. at 20.) In sum, D&K's current 
appeal is nothing more than an attempt to create issues and arguments where none existed 
before the trial court. 
This Court previously decided the controlling legal issues in this case in D&K I. 
In D&K I, this Court agreed with the trial court and with D&K's more candid arguments 
and found that "the material facts in this case appear to be undisputed." 2003 UT 5, ^ 9. 
The Court went on to note that "there are disputes [such as, historically,] whether rent 
was timely paid,. . . but these factual disputes are not material." Id. at n.2. This Court 
determined that, in initially granting IHC summary judgment, the trial court 
"misapprehended one material fact" and remanded to the trial court to review D&K's 
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"waiver" defense "under the totality of the circumstances." Id. at <|[ 9.l 
Even though the instructions on remand were limited to review of the waiver 
issue, and even though D&K limited its arguments to the trial court to the waiver issue on 
remand, D&K now attempts to reverse the trial court's renewed ruling in favor of IHC 
based on new legal theories that it never argued to the trial court. Chiefly, D&K claims 
that it should now be entitled to a trial on the theory of "substantial compliance." 
(Appellant's Br. at 20.) This theory was never mentioned to the trial court until the trial 
court's second summary judgment ruling (after remand) was being certified for appeal. 
(Id. at 9.) It was never briefed until after the Court of Appeals determined the case was 
not yet ripe for appeal, in a motion to reconsider. (Id. at 11.) Oddly, D&K claims that it 
preserved the defense of substantial compliance by pleading "unconscionability" in its 
answer. (Id. at 23-24.) It argues that unconscionability and substantial compliance are 
synonymous and therefore, because it "substantially complied" with the Lease, it would 
be "unconscionable" to allow IHC to forfeit its leasehold. (Id.) This argument is odd for 
the reason that it has already been disposed of by this Court. In D&K /, this Court 
expressly held that "[permitting IHC to enforce the forfeiture provision of the written 
lease agreement after D&K's failure to pay rent following a one-month acquiescence in 
late payment is not unconscionable . . . " 2003 UT 5 at f^ 11. 
In sum, having found that (1) there were no disputed facts regarding the waiver 
issue that would preclude summary judgment, (and D&K having conceded as much to the 
1
 In addition to the waiver defense, D&K also raised an estoppel defense at the 
trial court and on appeal in D&K I. This Court held that IHC could not be estopped from 
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trial court), and (2) it is not unconscionable to allow IHC to enforce the forfeiture 
provision based upon one month's missed rent, this Court has already disposed of all of 
the arguments D&K now makes. 
IV. RESPONSE TO APPELLANT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
As in D&K I, Appellant's Statement of Facts is set forth in general prosaic form, 
without numbered paragraphs, making direct challenges to the claims difficult. However, 
this Court should note that the facts set forth by D&K in an attempt to demonstrate a 
dispute are the same facts that this Court already found to be irrelevant in D&K I. Id. at 
n.2. .:.'" 
April Rent. The sole "new" fact that this Court asked the trial court to consider on 
remand was the fact that IHC retained D&K's April 1998 rent check. Id. at % 9. 
However, this fact is immaterial in light of the fact that IHC cashed D&K's April rent 
check before it elected to terminate the Lease by issuing a Notice of Default. 
Importantly, D&K paid the April rent on April 8, 1998. (Appellant's Br. at 5.) IHC sent 
D&K a Notice of Default and Forfeiture of Lease Agreement on April 14, 1998 because, 
at that time, March 1998 rent still had not been paid. {Id.) In other words, at the time 
IHC issued a Notice of Default, D&K was undisputedly in default, and IHC had the right 
to exercise any of its contractually-reserved options under the Lease. Indeed, D&K did 
not even attempt to tender the March rent until April 16, 1998. (Id.) It is undisputed that 
IHC never accepted the March rent. (Id.) 
forfeiting D&K's leasehold as a matter of law. D&K I, 2003 UT 5, ^  12. 
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A. Relevant Facts for This Court to Consider 
Because IHC was awarded summary judgment, the only facts this Court need 
consider are those the trial court found undisputed to see if they give rise to judgment as a 
matter of law. Those facts are: 
1. In January 1998, IHC purchased a strip mall at 52nd South State Street, 
Murray, Utah from Medical Plaza 9400. (Answer ^ 7; R. 39.) 
2. Before that purchase, D&K leased space in the mall (specifically, 5142 
South State Street) from Medical Plaza 9400, under a written lease agreement dated July 
18, 1994. (Answer T| 5; R. 39.) 
3. When IHC purchased the mall, it accepted an assignment of Medical Plaza 
9400's interest in the Lease. (Answer f 7; R. 40.) 
4. With the assignment of the Lease, D&K became IHC's tenant. Pursuant to 
section 3 of the Lease, D&K was obligated to pay IHC $3,280 per month in rent. 
(Answer 1ft 7, 8; R. 39-40.) 
5. According to Section 3 of the Lease, this rent was due "in advance of the 
first day of each calendar month . . . ." (Answer <| 8; R. 40.) 
6. Section 17.1 of the Lease provides, in pertinent part: 
Default by Tenant. Upon the occurrence of any of the 
following events, Landlord shall have the remedies set forth 
in Section 17.2: 
[a] Tenant fails to pay any other sum due hereunder within (10) days 
after the same / shall be due. 
(Answer 114;R.41.) 
7. Section 17.2, in turn, provides, in pertinent part: 
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Remedies. Upon the occurrence of the events set forth in 
Section 17.1, Landlord shall have the option to take any or all 
of the following actions, without further notice or demand of 
any kind to Tenant or any other person: 
[c] Termination of this lease by written notice to Tenant. In the event of 
such termination, Tenant agrees to immediately surrender possession 
of the Demised Premises. 
(Compl. Ex. A; R. 18; Answer If 15; R. 41.) 
8. After IHC took ownership of the property leased to D&K, D&K paid rent 
for February 1998. (Answer % 9; R. 40.) 
9. D&K did not make any rent payment for March 1998, during March 1998. 
(Answer 110; R. 40.) 
10. On or about April 8, 1998, D&K delivered a rent check to IHC's corporate 
headquarters for April rent (hereafter "April Rent"). This check was cashed by IHC 
shortly thereafter. (Answer 111; R. 41.) 
11. On April 14, 1998, after IHC cashed the April Rent check, IHC gave D&K 
written notice that it was exercising its option to terminate the Lease by sending D&K a 
Notice of Default and Forfeiture of Lease Agreement (hereafter the "Termination 
Notice").2 (Answer Tl 16; R. 42.) 
The Termination Notice was written as though no April rent had been paid. (R. 
29.) This was due to the fact that, at the time the Termination Notice was sent, IHC's 
property managers did not know that D&K had paid April's rent. (See Aff. of Thomas 
Uriona, Feb. 2, 2001, f 6; R. 278-79.) IHC property managers subsequently discovered 
that D&K had delivered a check to IHC's corporate offices (rather than to the property 
managers) and had designated the check as "April rent." (Id.) However, it is an 
undisputed fact that as of April 14, 1998, D&K still had failed to pay March 1998 rent. 
(Appellant's Br. at 5.) Additionally, when D&K ultimately tendered March 1998 rent on 
April 16, 1998, that check, like all subsequent rental payments, was rejected. (Id.) Since 
that time, IHC has placed all of D&K's tendered rents in escrow, according to an 
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12. On or about April 16, 1998, D&K attempted to tender its March 1998 rent. 
(Aff. of Kent Bangerter, May 19, 2002,114; R. 120.) However, IHC rejected that 
payment and returned the check to D&K. (Id. ^ 15.) 
13. On or about March 1, 1999, D&K and IHC entered into a Consent, 
Reservation of Rights and Escrow Deposit Agreement ("Escrow Agreement") whereby 
D&K could tender what it claimed to be additional accruing rents, and IHC could reject 
such payments without waiving any of its rights under the Lease. (R. 157-162.) The 
Escrow Agreement was designed to preserve the status quo of the landlord/tenant 
relationship, without either party being accused of having waived their arguments in this 
litigation. 
14. Paragraph 4 of the Escrow Agreement provides that: 
[T]he parties agree that, by the execution and delivery of this Escrow 
Agreement, IHCHS does not waive its claims of default and/or forfeiture of 
the Lease Agreement against D&K Management by allowing D&K 
Management to continue to occupy the Leased Premises or to make any one 
or all of the Escrow Deposits, and all of IHCHS' claims and assertions 
against D&K Management, including without limitation those set forth in 
the Default Letter, and against any defenses of D&K Management, whether 
articulated before or after the date of this Escrow Agreement, are expressly 
reserved and not waived by reason of this Escrow Agreement and shall not 
in any way be lessened or diminished by reason of or in connection with the 
execution and delivery of this Escrow Agreement. (Emphasis added) (R. 
157-58. Attached hereto as Exhibit B.) 
agreement that IHC "does not waive its claim of default and/or forfeiture of the Lease 
Agreement by allowing D&K Management to continue to occupy the Leased 
Premises . . . ." (Answer If 20; R. 42-43.) In short, it is an undisputed fact that no rent 
payments were accepted by IHC after it delivered the Termination Notice to D&K. 
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15. Since sending the Termination Notice, IHC has never accepted any 
payment from D&K except pursuant to the Escrow Agreement. (Answer % 20; R. 43-43.) 
IHC submits that these undisputed facts (hereafter "Facts") entitled it to judgment 
against D&K as a matter of law for forfeiture of the Lease; IHC's post-Termination 
Notice conduct cannot now be claimed a waiver of its rights to terminate D&K's 
leasehold. 
V. RESPONSE TO STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
D&K raises four issues on this appeal. It claims that all four issues involve pure 
questions of law which allow no deference to the trial court and which should be 
reviewed for correctness. (Appellant's Br. at 1-3). This is only partially correct. 
Issue 1. D&K's first issue involves an appeal from the trial court's grant of 
summary judgment to IHC on the issue of forfeiture of the Lease. Although the decision 
of whether to grant summary judgment is normally reviewed for correctness, trial courts 
have broad discretion in determining whether a waiver has occurred. See Living 
Scriptures, Inc. v. Kudlik, 890 P.2d 7, 10-11 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (reviewing trial court's 
decision to reject defendant-tenant's waiver defense as a matter of law under an abuse of 
discretion standard). Indeed, as this Court recognized in D&K I, "unlike most cases, the 
legal conclusions underlying a trial court's grant of summary judgment on a waiver issue 
are reviewed with some measure of deference." 2003 UT 5 at \ 6. Accordingly, on this 
appeal, this Court should again determine whether the trial court's decision on the 
application of the law of waiver to the facts of this case "falls within the bounds of [the 
trial court's] discretion." Id. 
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Issue 2. D&K's second issue, whether the trial court erred by denying it a trial on 
substantial compliance, was raised by D&K for the first time in a motion to reconsider. 
Necessarily then, D&K must argue that the trial court improperly denied its motion to 
reconsider. Indeed, D&K's own papers indicate it appeals from the trial court's order 
denying its motion to reconsider. (Appellant's Br. at 2.) 
Whether to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration is a matter on which 
deference is given to the trial court, and such a ruling will be disturbed only for an abuse 
of discretion. Timm v. Dewsnup, 921 P.2d 1381, 1386 (Utah 1996). Therefore, any 
argument that D&K makes pertaining to the trial court's alleged error in failing to grant it 
a trial on the issue of substantial compliance must be reviewed for an abuse of discretion, 
not for correctness. 
Issues 3 & 4. Whether to grant an award of attorney's fees is a legal conclusion; 
however, the calculation of any particular award is "in the sound discretion of the trial 
court, and will not be overturned in the absence of a showing of a clear abuse of 
discretion." Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988) (internal cites 
omitted). Further, determining which party was the "prevailing party" on a particular 
motion or appeal for purposes of awarding attorney's fees "depends, to a large measure, 
on the context of each case," and, therefore is left to the sound discretion of the trial 
court. R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook, 2002 UT 11, If 25, 40 P.3d 1119. In other words, the 
trial court's decision as to who was the "prevailing party" on each matter in this case is 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, this Court should review the trial 
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court's decision as to the amount of attorney's fees that it awarded to IHC under an abuse 
of discretion standard. 
VI. SUMMARY 
In summary, the issues D&K has raised should be disposed of as follows: 
Issue 1: Did the trial court fail to view the facts in the light most favorable to 
D&K and improperly draw inferences that were the province of the jury in granting IHC 
summary judgment on the issue of waiver? 
Answer: No. There are no disputed facts in this case; therefore, a jury trial is 
unwarranted. The trial court properly exercised its discretion to conclude that the 
undisputed facts could not give rise to a clear expression of intent on the part of IHC to 
waive its right to terminate the Lease. Because IHC's retention of the April Rent was not 
an affirmative act undertaken by IHC after it declared that D&K forfeited the Lease, it 
does not demonstrate a clear intent to waive forfeiture once forfeiture was declared. 
Moreover, the trial court properly concluded that IHC's actions were necessary to protect 
its interests after a stay was imposed pending the outcome of this litigation and were 
undertaken pursuant to the Escrow Agreement by which D&K agreed that IHC's conduct 
would not constitute a waiver. 
Issue 2: In refusing to allow D&K a jury trial on substantial compliance, did 
the trial court err in: 
a. declaring forfeiture without a pleading of materiality of breach? 
Answer: No. D&K never moved to dismiss IHC's complaint on 
this basis, so this argument has not been preserved for appeal. Nor do the notice pleading 
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rules require IHC to specifically plead "materiality." It was sufficient for IHC to plead 
that D&K breached the Lease. Moreover, D&K's failure to pay rent was a material 
breach of the Lease. 
b. ruling that D&K had not raised substantial compliance in its 
pleadings? 
Answer: No. D&K failed to plead "substantial compliance" in 
its Answer. Nor did it seek leave to amend its Answer to assert this defense. D&K's 
assertion of an "unconscionability" defense did not adequately place IHC on notice that 
D&K intended to rely on a "substantial compliance" defense. To the extent that D&K 
argues that "substantial compliance" is the same defense as "unconscionability," this 
Court has already ruled that termination of the Lease is not unconscionable. 
c. ruling that the law of the case precluded consideration of substantial 
compliance? 
Answer: No. The trial court properly refused to revisit its grant 
of summary judgment in favor of IHC under the law of the case doctrine because no 
"exceptional circumstances" were present sufficient to warrant reopening the decision on 
the forfeiture matter. Exceptional circumstances were lacking due to the fact that D&K 
itself was responsible for its own failure to argue substantial compliance during the 
summary judgment phase of this litigation. 
d. failing to consider D&K's Motion for Reconsideration under the 
standards applicable to Rule 54(b)? 
SaltLake-310675.4 0033566-00014 11 
Answer: No. Under Rule 56(e) D&K is wholly responsible for 
its failure to raise substantial compliance during the summary judgment phase of this 
litigation. D&K opted to rely solely on waiver and estoppel defenses when faced with 
summary judgment on the issue of forfeiture. D&K must now face the consequences of 
that decision. Rule 54(b) does not provide a basis for D&K to get a second chance to 
relitigate its case after it lost on waiver and estoppel. Accordingly, the trial court 
properly exercised its discretion in refusing to grant D&K's Motion to Reconsider, 
e. ruling that D&K had not presented facts that would support 
substantial compliance? 
Answer: No. D&K's "facts" regarding substantial compliance 
are the same facts that it relied upon for its estoppel defense. This Court ruled against 
D&K on that defense. Therefore, D&K has not raised any new facts that would lead to a 
different outcome under the theory of "substantial compliance." 
Issue 3: Did the trial court err in deciding that IHC was entitled to attorneys' 
fees under a provision in the Lease that allowed recovery of fees for an action filed 
"during the term" of the Lease? 
Answer: No. IHC is entitled to attorneys' fees because IHC brought this 
action to enforce its rights under the Lease. The Lease explicitly provides IHC with a 
right to attorneys' fees incurred in enforcing the Lease. Specifically, IHC brought this 
action to enforce section 17.2[c] of the Lease, whereby D&K agreed to vacate the 
premises upon receiving IHC's Termination Notice. 
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Issue 4: Did the trial court err in awarding fees on the basis of the record 
below where: 
a. IHC failed to provide evidence upon which the trial court could 
determine that IHC s were necessary and reasonable? 
Answer: No. IHC provided ample evidence in support of the 
reasonableness of its fees. This is evidenced by the fact that it took D&K over a month 
and a half to respond to IHC's Affidavit of Attorneys' Fees. Moreover, over 300 pages 
of the trial court record are devoted solely to the reasonableness of IHC's fees. 
b. IHC failed to apportion its fees to matters on which it was successful 
and the court effectively shifted to D&K the burden of apportioning 
IHC's fees between successful and unsuccessful matters? 
Answer: No. The trial court did require IHC to resubmit a 
second Affidavit of Fees removing fees for matters on which IHC did not prevail. The 
trial court properly exercised its discretion in apportioning and determining the 
reasonableness of the fees. 
c. the court awarded IHC fees for matters on which it was not 
successful, contrary to applicable precedent? 
Answer: No. The trial court had broad discretion in 
determining whether IHC "prevailed" on any given matter. The trial court further 
instructed IHC to remove fees on certain matters for which IHC was not the prevailing 
party. What is more, the trial court disallowed IHC to recover over $40,000 of fees for 
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matters for which the trial court did not find IHC to be the prevailing party. In sum, 
D&K has not demonstrated that the trial court committed patent error in allocating fees, 
d. the court failed to make findings of fact necessary to permit 
appellate review of the reasonableness, necessity and apportionment 
of issues? 
Answer: No. The trial court satisfied its obligation to make 
explicit findings under each Bracken factor and under the Rules of Professional Conduct. 
Further, appellate review of the reasonableness of the fees is limited to an abuse of 
discretion. Accordingly, the trial court's findings demonstrate that the trial court clearly 
did not abuse its discretion in awarding fees. 
VI. ARGUMENT 
1. The Trial Court Properly Granted IHC Summary Judgment as a Matter of 
Law, Despite D&K's Waiver Claim. 
Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. D&KI, 2003 UT 5, <([ 
11; Soter's, Inc. v. DeseretFed. Sav. & Loan, 857 P.2d 935, 942 (Utah 1993). Waiver 
requires three elements: (1) an existing right; (2) knowledge of its existence; and (3) an 
intention to relinquish the right. Id. at 940. "Intent to relinquish a right must be distinct" 
in order for waiver to occur. Id. A trial court is granted "very broad discretion" in 
determining whether a waiver has occurred in a particular case. Living Scriptures, Inc. v. 
Kudlik, 890 P.2d 7, 10 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (citing State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 938-39 
(Utah 1994)). Accordingly, the trial court in this case had broad latitude in concluding 
that IHC's conduct did not amount to waiver as a matter of law. 
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A. Waiver May Be Decided as a Matter of Law, 
D&K correctly notes that intent, an essential element of waiver, is generally a 
question of fact. Nevertheless, courts have not hesitated to rule as a matter of law on the 
issue of waiver when the evidence is conclusive or the facts undisputed. E.g., American 
Sav. & Loan Ass }n v. Blomquist, 445 P.2d 1, 3-4 (Utah 1968) (holding that waiver may 
be determined as a matter of law if evidence of intent is conclusive); Davidsohn v. Doyle, 
825 P.2d 1227, 1229-30 (Nev. 1992) (holding that summary judgment may be granted on 
a waiver issue); NationsBank of Georgia v. Conifer Asset Mgmt, Ltd., 928 P.2d 760, 763 
(Colo. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that deciding waiver as a matter of law is warranted if 
material facts are not in dispute); Jones v. Maestas, 696 P.2d 920, 922 (Idaho Ct. App. 
1992) (deciding waiver as a matter of law). To be sure, in Olympus Hills, the court ruled 
as a matter of law against the tenant-defendant on its waiver defense. Olympus Hills 
Shopping Ctr.y Ltd v. Smith's Food & Drug Ctrs., Inc., 889 P.2d 445, 461 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994), cert, denied, 899 P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995). 
If each waiver defense necessarily demanded a trial, as D&K's argument implies, 
not only would Olympus Hills and the other above-mentioned authorities need to be 
reversed, but this Court's ruling in D&K I would also need to be overturned. In D&K I, 
this Court did not remand for a jury trial. Instead, it remanded "to the trial court for 
reconsideration of its prior ruling in light of the correct facts regarding the April 
payment." Id. at f 9 (emphasis added). Had this Court been persuaded by D&K's 
arguments, which it merely repeats again on this appeal, this Court could have and simply 
would have remanded for a trial. See J. Pochynok Co., Inc. v. Smedsrud, 2007 UT App 
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88, % 14 ("if the supreme court determined that a . . . trial was the only way to determine 
[an issue], it would have so directed the trial court in its remand."). This Court correctly 
gave deference to the trial court to decide whether a trial was necessary in light of the 
April Rent. This ruling necessarily encompassed the understanding that the trial court 
may well conclude that the one additional fact regarding the April Rent did not warrant a 
trial. D&K's argument that the question of intent is always subject to a fact-finder's 
inquiry contradicts D&KI, Olympus Hills, and all other cases deciding waiver on 
summary judgment. 
B. Summary Judgment Was Warranted Because There Are No Disputed 
Material Facts. 
Summary judgment should be granted when there is "no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Utah 
R. Civ. P. 56(c). In reviewing a trial court's grant of summary judgment, an appellate 
court need only decide "whether the trial court erred in applying the law and whether a 
material fact was in dispute." E.g., Ford v. Amer. Express Fin. Advisors, Inc., 2004 UT 
70,19,98P.3dl5. 
It is the law of the case, from a ruling of this Court, that there are no disputed facts 
that would necessarily preclude a ruling on summary judgment on the issue of waiver in 
this case. In D&KI, this Court held that the material facts in this case regarding waiver 
are undisputed, specifically noting that any factual disputes were "irrelevant" or 
"immaterial." D&KI, 2003 UT 5,19, n.2. Indeed, after receiving this Court's opinion, 
D&K conceded to the trial court that there were no disputed facts regarding any legal 
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issues surrounding IHC's right to obtain possession of the property. During a May 26, 
2004 hearing before the trial court, following remand from this Court, the following 
colloquy took place: 
THE COURT: No facts left that determine possession, are there? Only the 
damages that result from forfeiture of staying in possession? 
COUNSEL FOR D&K: I would agree with your Honor that, given the 
Court's ruling, there are no facts left - no facts left that have to be decided. 
There were no facts initially with this motion for summary judgment 
(Emphasis added.) 
THE COURT: Uh-huh, (affirmative). 
COUNSEL FOR D&K: But given this ruling, there are no facts that have 
to be decided for possession. However there are a number of facts and 
there are certainly issues that remain with regard to their damages. 
(Emphasis added). 
(H'rg Tr., 4:24-5:11, May 26, 2004; R. 999. Ex. A.)3 
Thus, not only has this Court previously ruled that there are no disputed material 
facts to defeat summary judgment on the issue of waiver, but D&K itself conceded to the 
trial court that there were no disputed facts on the issue of possession.4 Having instructed 
the trial court that there were no material disputed facts, D&K cannot now complain to 
this Court that the trial court accepted its own concession. 
Significantly, IHC'S claims for damages were dismissed voluntarily, so no such 
claims, and no such fact disputes, exist today. 
4
 It is significant that the trial court asked D&K if there were any fact disputes that 
would preclude a legal ruling on "possession" rather than merely limiting its inquiry to 
the waiver defense. D&K was specifically asked if there was any factual inquiry that 
remained for any legal theory regarding IHC's right to take possession of its property. 
D&K candidly instructed the court that there were not. Certainly, if it was going to raise 
substantial compliance, or any of the alleged disputes D&K now claims exist, it was 
under an obligation to do so when asked by the trial court. 
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To be sure, the parties do not dispute that IHC sent D&K the Termination Notice 
on April 14, 1999. (Fact 11.) Similarly, they do not dispute that, at the time of the 
Termination Notice, D&K was in default because it had not paid rent for March 1998. 
(Facts 9, 12.) The parties do not dispute that IHC never accepted or cashed any rent 
check after April 1998, except under the Escrow Agreement, pursuant to which D&K 
agreed that IHC did "not waive its claims of default and/or forfeiture of the Lease." 
(Facts 14, 15.) 
IHC does not dispute that it inadvertently cashed the April Rent check before 
sending D&K the Termination Notice, and that the payment was never returned to D&K. 
(Fact 10.) However, the single undisputed fact that IHC retained the April Rent payment 
does not preclude summary judgment, as suggested by D&K. To the contrary, because 
there is no dispute as to any material fact, a trial is unwarranted on the waiver issue. See, 
e.g., Gary Porter Constr. v. Fox Constr., Inc., 2004 UT App 354, U 48, 101 P.3d 371 
("Because [defendant] did not set forth facts sufficient to create a disputed issue of 
material fact, . . . the trial court did not err by concluding that [plaintiff] was entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.") Because the retention of the April Rent is undisputed, 
there was no reason for a jury to consider the "totality of the circumstances" on remand 
from D&K I. There are no facts for a jury to decipher. 
Because each fact that D&K alleges supports a finding of waiver is undisputed, the 
trial court was free to rule on the waiver issue as a matter of law. See Soter 's, 857 P.2d 
at 940 (describing the issue of whether "intentional relinquishment was or was not 
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shown" as a "legal question"). Consequently, the trial court did not err in refusing to 
grant D&K a jury trial on the waiver defense. 
C. Viewing the Facts in the Light Most Favorable to D&K, a Waiver Did Not 
Occur. 
Even after this Court ruled that the trial court initially misapprehended one fact 
regarding the April Rent, IHC was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. One 
additional fact—that IHC retained the April Rent after inadvertently cashing D&K's 
check—does not alter the conclusion that IHC did not waive its right to terminate the 
Lease. 
In order to survive summary judgment on a waiver defense, a defendant must 
show facts that could support an inference that the plaintiff "clearly intended" to waive a 
known right. See Soter 's9 857 P.2d at 940 (stating that waiver should not "be found from 
any particular set of facts unless it was clearly intended"). In rejecting the stilted, single-
fact-specific waiver analysis proposed by D&K in D&K I, this Court clearly stated that, 
to find a waiver, a fact-finder must determine whether the totality of the circumstances 
supports an inference that waiver was "distinctly made." D&K I, 2003 UT 5 at f^ 4 
(quoting Soter's, 857 P.2d at 942). D&K argues that IHC's retention of the April Rent, 
"Dear Tenant" letters, receipt of rent checks under the Escrow Agreement, and demands 
for insurance create a triable dispute as to whether an implied waiver occurred. 
(Appellant's Br. at 18-20.) D&K is wrong. 
First, regarding the April Rent, it is undisputed that D&K paid the April Rent 
before IHC issued the Termination Notice and that IHC has never accepted any payments 
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after it declared forfeiture (except under the Escrow Agreement). (Facts 11, 15.) Simply 
put, the mere fact that IHC retained rent that it received before it declared forfeiture does 
not suggest that IHC waived its right to declare the forfeiture. Indeed, IHC had no 
obligation under the Lease to return any rent payments that it received before its 
declaration of forfeiture. Therefore, by simply retaining the April Rent, IHC did not 
affirmatively or "distinctly " engage in conduct from which a fact-finder could infer an 
intent to relinquish any forfeiture rights under the Lease. Cf Soter's, 857 P.2d at 940 
("mere silence is not a waiver unless there is a duty or obligation to speak.") (quoting 
Plateau Mining Co. v. Div. of State Lands & Forestry, 802 P.2d 720, 730 (Utah 1990). 
IHC's retention of D&K's April Rent was no more a "distinctly made" waiver than its 
retention of D&K's February 1998 rent, because D&K paid both rents before IHC 
declared forfeiture. Consequently, the April Rent is irrelevant to either the question of 
default by D&K or waiver by IHC. In fact, the trial court's ruling found D&K in default 
under the Lease based solely on the missed March 1998 rent payment. (Order, July 29, 
2004, 3; R. 1100.) 
Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that IHC had received and retained the 
April Rent after it declared forfeiture, a fact-fmder still could not infer an intent to waive 
based on that fact alone. See, e.g., Living Scriptures, Inc., 890 P.2d at 10 (recognizing 
that the mere acceptance of a rental payment from a tenant in breach, while enforcing 
other rights under a lease, is not alone enough to constitute waiver of the right to 
terminate a lease for default); Olympus Hills Shopping Ctr., Ltd., 889 P.2d at 461 (same); 
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see also Davidsohn, 825 P.2d at 1229-30. Regardless, that is not what occurred here, no 
matter how favorably the facts are viewed to D&K. 
The remainder of IHC's actions (the "Dear Tenant" letters, demands for proof of 
insurance, etc.) do not give rise to an inference that IHC intended to affirm the Lease for 
two main reasons. First, the trial court issued a stay in this matter, thereby allowing 
D&K to remain in the premises owned by IHC pending the final outcome of this 
litigation. (R. 685-89.) Because this stay effectively obligated IHC to act as D&K's 
"landlord," IHC was required to undertake certain actions to protect itself, such as 
requiring that the building be insured. Therefore, contrary to D&K's argument that 
IHC's conduct should have been viewed most favorably to D&K so as to suggest that 
IHC intended to affirm the Lease, IHC's conduct could only be viewed as consistent with 
IHC's desire to preserve its right to terminate the Lease. At most, IHC's conduct 
demonstrated only its reasonable efforts to protect its rights and interests while the 
dispute over the forfeit of the Lease continued. 
Second, the parties entered into an Escrow Agreement, which expressly states that 
"IHCHS does not waive its claims of default and/or forfeiture of the Lease Agreement 
against D&K" by allowing D&K to remain in possession of the property during this 
litigation. (Fact 14 (emphasis added).) The trial court was required to consider the 
Escrow Agreement under the "totality of the circumstances." See Living Scriptures, Inc., 
890 P.2d at 10 n.5 (holding that an anti-waiver provision is a factor to consider in 
determining whether a waiver has occurred). Thus, D&K's argument that IHC engaged 
in "dozens of acts . . . that recognized the Lease as in force" (Appellant's Br. at 20), is 
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directly contrary to D&K's contractual agreement and should be disregarded by this 
Court. 
In sum, given the trial court's discretion to decide whether the "totality of 
circumstances" could give rise to an inference that IHC "distinctly made" a waiver, the 
trial court clearly did not err. The trial court properly exercised its discretion in applying 
the law of waiver to the facts of this case, and its grant of summary judgment in favor of 
IHC was not an abuse of discretion. 
2. D&K Cannot Belatedly Seek a Trial on Substantial Compliance. 
C. D&K Impermissibly Argues That IHC Failed to Plead Materiality of 
Breach for the First Time on Appeal. 
As an initial matter, D&K argues that IHC failed to state a claim upon which relief 
can be granted because "IHC did not plead materiality" of the breach of the Lease. 
(Appellant's Br. 22.) The Court cannot consider this untimely argument because D&K 
has raised it for the first time on appeal. See, e.g., Brookside Mobile Home Park, Ltd. v. 
Peebles, 2002 UT 48, ^ 14, 48 P.3d 968 ("in order to preserve an issue for appeal, the 
issue must be presented to the trial court in such a way that the trial court has an 
opportunity to rule on that issue.") As D&K itself notes, an issue is not preserved for 
appeal unless: (1) it was timely raised; (2) it was specifically raised; and (3) a party 
introduced supporting evidence and relevant legal authority to the trial court. Id. 
(Appellant's Br. 28 (quoting Albores v. Bracamontes, 2006 UT App 204, ^ 4).) 
Here, D&K never raised this argument to the trial court before or after D&K I. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that D&K fails to point to a single instance where it argued 
to the trial court that IHC's Complaint should be dismissed for failure to plead materiality 
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of breach. To be sure, the argument that IHC failed to state a claim upon which relief can 
be granted could only have been raised in a pleading or by motion to the trial court. See 
Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b), 12(h). Instead, D&K raises this argument on its second appeal to 
this Court, a full eight years after it filed its Answer. Without a doubt, D&K's assertion 
is untimely and cannot be considered by this Court.5 See also Utah R. App. P. 
24(a)(5)(A) (stating that appellate briefs must contain a "citation to the record showing 
that an issue was preserved in the trial court"). v 
B. D&K Waived Its Substantial Compliance Defense When It Failed to Plead 
This Affirmative Defense in its Answer. 
Despite the fact that the affirmative defense of "substantial compliance" was 
nowhere mentioned by D&K until 2004, five years after it filed its original answer and 
after summary judgment was already entered in favor of IHC twice, and after summary 
judgment was reviewed by this Court once, D&K now asks this Court to accept that it 
raised substantial compliance in its original answer. (Appellant's Br. at 23-24.) In fact, 
D&K raised the defense of "substantial compliance" for the first time in a Motion to 
Reconsider, following the renewed motion for summary judgment after D&KL {Id. at 9; 
see also R. 1108.) D&K argues that it preserved the right to assert "substantial 
5
 Even if this Court were to consider the merits of D&K's argument, it should be 
rejected outright. First, D&K's failure to pay rent is a material breach. See, e.g., 
McKeon v. Williams, 799 P.2d 198 (Or. Ct. App. 1991) ("failure to pay rent could be 
nothing other than a material breach."). Second, D&K offers no authority for the 
proposition that IHC must actually plead materiality of the breach in its complaint. {See 
Appellant's Br. 22 (stating that the case law merely "suggests" that materiality is an 
essential element of a forfeiture claim).) Moreover, D&K's argument is at odds with 
Utah's notice pleading rules. See Utah R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1) ("Each averment of a pleading 
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compliance" by pleading the defense of "unconscionability" in its answer, because 
substantial compliance "constitutes a major part of the defense of unconscionability." 
(Appellant's Br. 23-24.). This matter may be summarily disposed of by the Court. 
Under Rule 8 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a party seeking to avoid a 
claim must, in plain and simple terms, plead any "matter constituting an avoidance or 
affirmative defense." Utah R. Civ. P. 8(c); see also Valley Bank & Trust Co. v. Wilken, 
668 P.2d 493 (Utah 1983). The primary purpose of requiring a defendant to plead 
affirmative defenses under Rule 8(c) "is to ensure that parties have adequate notice of the 
issues and facts in the case." Prince v. Bear River Mut. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 68, ^  30, 56 
P.3d 524. A plaintiff must have advance notice of the defendant's affirmative defenses in 
order to adequately assess whether and when to bring a motion for summary judgment. 
Valley Bank & Trust Co., 668 P.2d at 494. Therefore, affirmative defenses that are not 
pled in accordance with the rules of civil procedure are waived. Id. 
Here, prior to D&K's Motion to Reconsider, neither IHC nor the trial court were 
ever put on notice that D&K intended to rely on a substantial compliance defense. D&K 
offers no explanation as to how IHC or the trial court should have surmised that its 
defense of "unconscionability" encompassed a possible "substantial compliance" 
argument.6 
shall be simple, concise, and direct. No technical forms of pleading or motions are 
required.") 
6
 D&K attempts to fault IHC for never briefing "or even mentioning]" the 
substantial compliance issue in its Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. (Appellant's 
Br. 28.) Yet, plaintiffs are never expected to anticipate defenses that a defendant such as 
D&K omits from its answer. Rather, the burden is always on defendants to adequately 
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D&K admits that substantial compliance is only a "part" of the broader doctrine of 
unconscionability. (Appellant's Br. 24.) Yet, if the defensive of substantial compliance 
is different from unconscionability, then that defense has clearly been waived. There is 
no dispute that D&K did not plead or argue "substantial compliance" in its pleadings, in 
the motion for summary judgment before Judge Livingston, in the first appeal to this 
Court, in the renewed motion for summary judgment before Judge Hilder, or in the 
briefing before the trial court and the Court of Appeals on certification. It raised it for the 
first time in a Motion to Reconsider with Judge Hilder after each of those other rulings 
had already been handed down. 
On the other hand, if "substantial compliance" and "unconscionability" are the 
same defense, as D&K suggests, then this matter has already been ruled on by this Court. 
In D&K I, this Court expressly held that it would not be "unconscionable" to allow IHC 
to forfeit D&K's Lease based upon a single month's missed rent. "Permitting IHC to 
enforce the forfeiture provision of the written lease after D&K's failure to pay rent 
following a one month acquiescence and late payment is not unconscionable." D&K I, 
2003 UT 5,^11. Based upon the foregoing, this entire defense should be passed over by 
this Court. Simply put, the matter has been ruled upon to the extent it has not been 
waived. 
apprise plaintiffs of their expected defenses. Utah R. Civ. P. 8(c); see also Valley Bank & 
Trust Co., 668 P.2d at 493-94 (holding that a defendant could not raise defenses in 
opposition to a motion for summary judgment that were not raised in its answer or by 
proper motion, because the plaintiff was entitled to proper notice of the defendant's 
affirmative defenses before moving for summary judgment). 
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As this Court has recognized, if defendants such as D&K could omit defenses 
from their answers and later raise them when faced with summary judgment, "summary 
judgment could always be thwarted." Valley Bank & Trust Co., 668 P.2d at 494. It is 
even more egregious to attempt to raise omitted defenses after summary judgment. If 
D&K wanted to assert substantial compliance as grounds for defeating summary 
judgment, it should have followed the rules of civil procedure and sought leave from the 
trial court to amend its answer.7 See id. It should have then briefed the defense in an 
attempt to defeat IHC's renewed motion for summary judgment, if not IHC's original 
o 
motion for judgment on the pleadings. D&K did not do so and thereby waived this 
defense. Moreover, because D&K waived this defense by failing to include it in its 
answer, D&K clearly cannot raise this defense now, on its second appeal. See id. ("Nor 
can the appellant raise [an affirmative] defense on appeal when it was not properly 
presented to the trial court."). 
C. Even if D&K Pled Substantial Compliance, it Waived This Defense By 
Failing to Argue it on Summary Judgment. 
7
 Although D&K added a "substantial compliance" defense to its answer to IHC's 
supplemental complaint in November 2004, the supplemental complaint did not change 
any pleading regarding the forfeiture issue and never gave D&K grounds to add defenses. 
Accordingly, D&K was required to seek leave from the trial court to add this defense 
under Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Because D&K never sought leave 
to do so, this defense was not properly asserted in the November 2004 answer. 
IHC's initial motion leading to judgment was for judgment on the pleadings. It 
was only converted to summary judgment by D&K's introduction of affidavits. Faced 
with the argument that nothing in the pleadings prevented judgment as a matter of law 
certainly obligated D&K to reference "substantial compliance" if it believed the doctrine 
would, as pleaded, prevent judgment. 
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As D&K concedes, IHC argued that "[a]ll of D&K's affirmative defenses fail as a 
matter of law" during the summary judgment phase of this litigation. (Appellant's Br. 7.) 
Yet, D&K never rebutted IHC's argument by defending its supposed substantial 
compliance defense to the trial court. (Id. at 28.) Perplexingly, D&K attempts to pin the 
blame for this omission on IHC. (Id. at 7, "IHC did not attack or even mention the 
defense of unconscionability [and therefore] D&K was under no obligation to brief that 
defense or provide factual support for it.") The Court should reject D&K's attempt to 
evade responsibility for its own unexcused omission. 
It is a basic rule of civil procedure that every party to litigation has a duty to 
"incorporate all relevant arguments in the papers that directly address a pending motion." 
Rocafort v. IBM Corp., 334 F.3d 115, 122 (1st Cir. 2003) (emphasis added). Moreover, a 
defendant bears the burden of proof on its affirmative defenses. State Bank ofS. Utah v. 
TroyHygro Sys., Inc., 894 P.2d 1270, 1277 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). Accordingly, a 
defendant waives any defenses that it fails to raise in response to a plaintiffs motion for 
summary judgment, even if those defenses were properly pled in the defendant's answer. 
H&G Ortho, Inc. v. Neodontics Int% Inc., 823 N.E.2d 718, 731 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005); 
Diversey Lever, Inc. v. Ecolab, Inc., 191 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
More specifically, Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that, 
when a party moves for summary judgment, the nonmovant "may not rest upon the mere 
allegations or denials of the pleadings, but the response . . . must set forth specific facts 
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e). In other words, the 
party opposing a motion for summary judgment has an affirmative duty to respond to the 
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motion with affidavits or other materials allowed by Rule 56(e). Waddoups v. 
Amalgamated Sugar Co., 2002 UT 69, ffif 31, 36, 54 P.3d 1054; State Bank ofS Utah, 
894 P.2d at 1277. Under Rule 56(e), a non-moving defendant must support any 
affirmative defenses it intends to rely upon to defeat the plaintiffs motion for summary 
judgment. See Pantry, Inc. v. Stop-N-Go Foods, Inc., 796 F.Supp. 1164, 1167 (S.D. Ind. 
1992) (holding that when a plaintiff moves for summary judgment on the issue of 
liability, the nonmovant has a duty to support any applicable affirmative defenses, and 
that simply pleading affirmative defenses in an answer does not preserve those defenses 
which are not argued in opposition to the motion for summary judgment). After 
summary judgment, a defense is no longer preserved simply because it was pled; under 
Rule 56(e), the defense must be argued to the trial court. Id.; United States v. AMC 
Entm't, Inc., 232 F.Supp.2d 1092, 1118-19 (CD. Cal. 2002). 
Here, IHC moved for judgment on the pleadings as to whether D&K forfeited the 
Lease.9 This triggered D&K's obligation to argue and support any and all affirmative 
defenses that would have defeated IHC's forfeiture claim.10 D&K could have and should 
9
 IHC's Motion was converted into a motion for summary judgment. D&K I, 2003 
UT5,n.l . 
10
 The fact that IHC specifically anticipated D&K's modification and waiver 
defenses in its motion is completely irrelevant. IHC had no burden to preserve D&K's 
substantial compliance defense by specifically rebutting it. Rather, D&K had a duty 
under Rule 56(e) to set forth all of its arguments—including its substantial compliance 
argument—which would have shown that there was a genuine issue for trial. D&K 
claims that because "waiver was dispositive" it did not need to raise substantial 
compliance to the trial court or in D&KL The disingenuity of this argument is revealed 
by the fact that D&K found it necessary to argue estoppel below and in D&KL If waiver 
truly was "dispositive" query why D&K found it necessary to not only bring and argue 
estoppel but to also seek a redetermination of this Court that its estoppel argument failed. 
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have raised the substantial compliance defense in its cross-motion for summary 
judgment. Yet, D&K did not do so. (Appellant's Br. 8 ("D&K asserted only waiver and 
an estoppel defense.").) Nor did D&K raise a substantial compliance defense on its 
appeal to this Court in D&K I, or on remand to the trial court after D&KI. In fact, at a 
March 2004 hearing to decide the forfeiture issue on remand, the trial court gave D&K's 
counsel repeated opportunities to raise other defenses in addition to waiver. In response, 
D&K continued to rely solely on its waiver argument. 
THE COURT: . . . if this Court was to determine under the undisputed facts that 
are now in the record, that a waiver has not occurred, is there some reason under 
the law of summary judgment, this Court could not do that? 
COUNSEL FOR D&K: Absolutely. . . waiver 
(Hr'g Tr., 10:3-12, Mar. 2, 2004; R. 839. Attached hereto as Exhibit C.) 
The very first time that D&K even mentioned substantial compliance was two 
motions after Judge Hilder's question, during a May 2004 hearing on IHC's Motion for 
Rule 54(b) Certification. (Appellant's Br. 9.) However, at that hearing, following 
repeated interrogation by the trial court, D&K twice conceded that the forfeiture issue 
was resolved and only damages remained to be determined: 
COUNSEL FOR D&K: I would agree that, given this Court's ruling, there are no 
facts left - no facts left that have to be decided. There were no facts initially with 
this motion for summary judgment. 
COUNSEL FOR D&K: But given this ruling, there are no facts that have to be 
decided for possession. 
(Hr'g Tr., 5:2-10, May 26, 2004; R. 999. Ex. A (emphasis added).) 
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In sum, D&K clearly did not meet its burden under Rule 56(e) to set forth specific 
facts showing that there was a genuine issue for trial on substantial compliance. Thus, 
D&K waived any substantial compliance defense. 
D. The Trial Court Was Well Within Its Discretion To Refuse To Consider 
The Substantial Compliance Defense on D&K's Motion to Reconsider. 
D&K concedes that it first briefed the doctrine of substantial compliance to the 
trial court in its October 2005 Motion to Reconsider, a full year and a half after the trial 
court expressly asked D&K if there was any defense that would preclude summary 
judgment besides waiver,11 and a half decade after IHC moved for judgment on the 
pleadings. (Appellant's Br. 11.) D&K argues that the trial court erred in refusing to 
reconsider its grant of summary judgment in favor of IHC on the grounds that D&K 
substantially complied with the Lease. For several reasons, D&K is wrong. 
1. The Trial Court Was Not Required to Consider Substantial 
Compliance Because D&K Raised it For the First Time on a Motion 
to Reconsider. 
A trial court has discretion in declining to consider defenses that are argued for the 
first time in a motion for reconsideration. Matosantos Comm. Corp. v. Applebee's Int 'I, 
Inc., 245 F.3d 1203, 1209 (10th Cir. 2001) ("A motion for reconsideration is not, 
however, an opportunity for the losing party to raise new arguments that could have been 
presented originally."); Ogunwo v. Amer. Nat'llnsur. Co., 936 P.2d 606, 611 (Colo. Ct. 
11
 D&K states that it first mentioned the issue of substantial compliance during the 
May 2004 hearing on IHC's Motion for Rule 54(b) Certification. (Appellant's Br. 9.) 
However, D&K concedes that it did not fully address the defense at the hearing, and 
instead argued that the defense was "yet to be decided." (Id.) 
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App. 1997) ("a court need not entertain new theories on a motion to reconsider following 
the grant of summary judgment"). 
D&K did not raise substantial compliance during the summary judgment phase of 
the litigation, on appeal to this Court in D&K I, or on remand. This is especially 
surprising in light of D&K's current contention that it has known about this argument 
since it filed its original answer. (See Appellant's Br. 23 (arguing that D&K pled 
substantial compliance "at the outset of this litigation").) Tellingly, D&K offers no 
justification for its failure to argue this defense to the trial court, despite the fact that it 
supposedly has been aware of the defense since the "outset" (other than the erroneous 
argument that IHC had the burden to raise the defense on its behalf). Accordingly, the 
trial court was under no obligation to consider D&K's argument and therefore did not 
abuse its discretion in denying D&K's Motion to Reconsider. See Nance v. LJ. Dolloff 
Assoc, Inc., 126 P.3d 1215, 1221 (N.M. Ct. App. 2005) (finding that the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to reconsider a defense that a party knew 
about but failed to raise during the summary judgment phase of the litigation.) 
Further, once a trial court declines to consider a new theory raised by a party on a 
motion to reconsider, that party cannot pursue its theory on appeal, as D&K seeks to do 
here. Cooper v. Dist. Court, 133 P.3d 692, 716 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006). Accordingly, 
this Court should: (1) affirm the trial court's discretion to refuse to reconsider D&K's 
substantial compliance defense, and (2) refuse to consider that defense on this appeal. 
2. The Trial Court Correctly Ruled That the Law of the Case Doctrine 
Precluded it From Considering D&K's Substantial Compliance 
Argument. 
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In denying D&K's Motion to Reconsider, the trial court found that, in addition to 
the fact that D&K waived its substantial compliance argument, D&K was precluded from 
bringing the argument under the law of the case doctrine.12 (Order, Jan. 23, 2006, f 9; R. 
1370-75.) Therefore, even if this Court were to conclude that D&K did not waive its 
substantial compliance defense, the trial court's decision to deny D&K's Motion to 
Reconsider under the law of the case doctrine should be affirmed. 
Simply stated, the law of the case doctrine renders a decision made on an issue 
during one stage of a case binding on successive stages of the same litigation. Thurston 
v. Box Elder County, 892 P.2d 1034, 1037 (Utah 1995). The law of the case doctrine 
constrains a trial court's ability to reconsider its earlier rulings under Rule 54(b) of the 
rules of civil procedure.13 Virgin Ail. Airways, Ltd. v. Nat'I Mediation Bd., 952 F.2d 
1245, 1255 (2d Cir. 1992) ("Even if Rule 54(b) allows parties to request district courts to 
revisit earlier rulings, the moving party must do so within the strictures of the law of the 
D&K misstates the trial court's rationale for declining its Motion to Reconsider. 
D&K argues that the trial court relied "exclusively" on the Smith v. Osguthorpe decision, 
2005 UT App 11. (App.'s Brief at 25.) In fact, the trial court simply relied on the law of 
the case doctrine, "as described in Smith v. Osguthorpe." (Order, Jan. 23, 2006, f^ 9; R. 
1372 (emphasis added).) D&K's critique of the Osguthorpe decision, therefore, is of 
little avail to D&K, because the trial court correctly applied the law of the case doctrine, 
rather than one particular decision, to the facts of this case. 
13
 Although D&K brought its Motion to Reconsider under Rule 60(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, the trial court's denial of the Motion is more properly analyzed 
under Rule 54(b) because a final judgment had not yet been rendered. See Trembly v. 
Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306, 1310 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (holding that "the 
substance, not the caption of a motion is dispositive" and analyzing a motion to 
reconsider under Rule 54(b) rather than Rule 60(b) because a final judgment was not 
rendered in the case). However, it is noteworthy that D&K did not properly bring its 
Motion to Reconsider and that D&K's Motion "is not provided for under the Utah Rules 
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case doctrine"); 10 Moore's Federal Practice § 54.25[4] (3d ed. 2006) ("If motions based 
on the court's power under Rule 54(b) could compel the court to revisit those 
adjudications, much of the advantage in making the early rulings would be lost. For this 
reason, the law of the case doctrine provides some protection from routine reexamination 
of interlocutory adjudications."). 
D&K argues that the trial court was wrong to apply the law of the case doctrine 
because that the law of the case doctrine only applies to "issues actually or necessarily 
decided in a previous appeal," and the substantial compliance issue was never "decided in 
a previous appeal." (Appellant's Br. 25.) However, D&K's argument relies on the 
"mandate rule," which is merely one application of the multifaceted law of the case 
doctrine. Thurston, 892 P.2d at 1038 n.2 ("Law of the case terminology has been 
employed when addressing at least four distinct sets of problems. It has been used to 
justify a trial court's refusal to reconsider matters in a continuing proceeding and an 
appellate court's declining to reconsider matters resolved on a prior appeal. The 
terminology has also been used to express the principle that inferior tribunals are bound 
to honor the mandate of superior courts within a single judicial system. . . ."). Thus, 
D&K is wrong in arguing that the requirements of the "mandate rule" applied to the trial 
court on its Motion to Reconsider. 
In fact, in the context of a motion for reconsideration, the law of the case doctrine 
"is more flexible than the mandate rule." Id. at 1038. Indeed, on a motion to reconsider, 
of Civil Procedure, and . . . has never been recognized as a proper motion in this state." 
Wisden v. Bangerter, 893 P.2d 1057, 1058 (Utah 1995). 
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the law of the case doctrine simply holds that "a court is justified in refusing to reconsider 
matters it resolved in a prior ruling in the same case for reasons of efficiency and 
consistency" and that courts should not reopen issues previously decided unless narrow 
exceptional circumstances are present. Id. at 1039. Generally, the only "exceptional 
circumstances" under which a trial court should reopen an issue that is has previously 
decided are: (1) when there has been an intervening change of controlling authority; (2) 
when new evidence becomes available; or (3) when the prior decision was "clearly 
erroneous and would work a manifest injustice." Id. Absent these "exceptional 
circumstances," a trial court has discretion in refusing to revisit an issue that it had 
previously decided. Mower v. Jorgensen, 2006 UT App 329. 
Here, the trial court, on remand from D&K I, decided that D&K forfeited the lease 
as a matter of law. (Order, July 29, 2004; R. 1098-1103.) Therefore, the law of the case 
doctrine applied and prevented the trial court from revisiting the issue on D&K's Motion 
to Reconsider, absent "exceptional circumstances." The trial court did not find any 
exceptional circumstances present. (See Order, Jan. 23, 2006, % 7; R. 1372 ("The defense 
D&K wants to now argue is not new or novel, and indeed the main cases it relies upon in 
its present motion were all issued before D&K opposed IHCHS's initial Motion for 
Partial Judgment on the Pleadings."); \ 8 ("D&K cannot now, without cause, ask this 
Court to consider newly developed arguments that it denied existed more than a year 
ago.").) In sum, the trial court was well within its discretion in refusing to reconsider the 
substantial compliance issue. 
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Furthermore, even assuming arguendo that the law of the case doctrine's 
"mandate rule" applied rather than the more flexible standards applicable to a motion for 
reconsideration, D&K's argument that the trial court erred under the "mandate rule" still 
fails. Under the mandate rule, lower courts are bound to implement "both the letter and 
the spirit of the [appellate court's] mandate, taking into account the appellate court's 
opinion and the circumstances it embraces." Thurston, 892 P.2d at 1038 (emphasis 
added). In other words, an appellate court need not rule on each and every particular 
issue in a case in order for the appellate court's ruling to have preclusive effect. Id. 
Here, although this Court did not specifically rule on the substantial compliance 
defense in D&K I, this Court did decide the appropriate treatment of the forfeiture issue. 
The "spirit" of this Court's ruling was that the trial court should grant summary judgment 
in favor of IHC on the forfeiture issue if, after reconsideration of the totality of the 
circumstances, it found that waiver did not occur as a matter of law. D&K I, 2003 UT 5, 
j^ 12. The spirit of the Court's decision was not, as D&K suggests, that the trial court 
should afford D&K an opportunity to raise new defenses if it ultimately were to lose on 
the waiver argument. In fact, this Court explicitly ruled out the opportunity for D&K to 
raise a defense based on unconscionability: "Permitting IHC to enforce the forfeiture 
provision of the written lease after D&K's failure to pay rent following a one-month 
acquiescence in late payment is not unconscionable." Id. at ^ 1 1 . Thus, the trial court 
was correct in applying the law of the case doctrine to preclude D&K from rearguing the 
issue of forfeiture. 
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D&K next argues that the trial court's May 31, 2001 summary judgment decision 
was "reversed and no part of it was affirmed" by the Utah Supreme Court in D&K L 
(Appellant's Br. 27.) Therefore, according to D&K, the trial court erred in denying its 
Motion to Reconsider because the "vacated Memorandum Decision rendered May 31, 
2001 cannot possibly serve as a basis for application of law of the case." (Id.) D&K's 
argument is non sequitur for the simple reason that, in its Motion to Reconsider, D&K 
moved the trial court to reconsider the July 29, 2004 Order, not the May 31, 2001 Order. 
(Def.'s Mot. to Reconsider, Oct. 3, 2005; R. 1252-68.) Thus, the trial court denied 
reconsideration of its July 29, 2004 Order in part on the basis of law of the case. The 
July 29, 2004 Order has never been reviewed by an appellate court, let alone reversed or 
vacated. See IHCHealth Servs., Inc. v. D&KMgmt., Inc., 2005 UT App 33 (dismissing 
appeal of trial court's July 29, 2004 Order for lack of jurisdiction) (R. 1178-81.).14 
In sum, the Court should affirm the trial court's decision to deny D&K's Motion 
to Reconsider on the grounds that D&K was precluded from raising its substantial 
compliance defense under the law of the case. 
14
 D&K further characterizes the trial court's initial summary judgment decision as 
having been "reversed" in an effort to distinguish the present case from the Osguthorpe 
case on which the trial court relied in denying D&K's Motion to Reconsider. 
(Appellant's Br. 27.) In Osguthorpe, the appellate court "generally affirmed" the trial 
court's analysis but remanded so that particular evidence could be considered by the trial 
court. 2005 UT App 11. Similarly, in D&K I, this Court did not reverse the trial court's 
decision but rather remanded for reconsideration in light of one corrected fact. 2003 UT 
5 at f^ 9. In other words, this Court did "generally affirm" the trial court's treatment of 
the forfeiture issue in D&KL Thus, D&K's argument that Osguthorpe lies "[i]n sharp 
contrast [to] D&KF (Appellant's Br. 27), completely lacks merit. 
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3- D&K Was Not Entitled To Reconsideration Under the Standards of 
Rule 54(b). 
D&K is incorrect in arguing that "virtually every factor [under Rule 54(b)] would 
have supported reconsideration of [the trial court's] July 29, 2004 Order." (Appellant's 
Br. 29.) First, as discussed above, a trial court's decision to deny a motion to reconsider 
"is within the discretion of the trial court" and should not be disturbed absent an abuse of 
discretion. U.P.C., Inc. v. R.O.A. Gen., Inc., 1999 UT App 303, % 57, 990 P.2d 945 
(quoting Timm v. Dewsnup, 921 P.2d 1381 (Utah 1996)). Further, D&K, as the party 
bringing the motion to reconsider, bears the burden of justifying reversal of the trial 
court's summary judgment decision. Id. at ^ 58. Although the factors discussed by D&K 
(change in governing law, manifest injustice, inadequate briefing, and the need to correct 
the court's own errors) have been recognized by Utah courts as grounds that might 
warrant granting a motion to reconsider, Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306, 
1311 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), none of these factors are present here. 
i. Change In Governing Law Or Circumstances15 
A trial court may reconsider its prior ruling if the applicable law subsequently 
changes so as to render the court's ruling incorrect. See Trembly, 884 P.2d at 1311 
(holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting a motion to reconsider 
where, after summary judgment was denied, the Utah Supreme Court issued two 
15
 Although D&K cites "different circumstances" as a justification for granting its 
Motion to Reconsider (Appellant's Br. 30), D&K does not develop this argument or 
suggest how it is different from the "change in governing law" analysis. Therefore, IHC 
will address the "different circumstances" factor as part of the "change in governing law" 
factor. 
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decisions that altered the applicable legal framework). Here, D&K manipulates this rule 
to suggest that, because this Court disagreed with its waiver analysis in D&K I, there was 
a "substantial change in governing law" sufficient to warrant reconsideration. 
(Appellant's Br. 30.) The Court should reject D&K's argument. The simple truth is that, 
in D&K I, D&K misinterpreted Utah case law regarding the waiver analysis and lost its 
estoppel argument. Now, having the benefit of this Court's ruling on the waiver and 
estoppel issues, D&K wants a chance to start from scratch. Obviously, this is not a 
legitimate basis for reconsideration of the trial court's summary judgment ruling. 
In D&K I, this Court did not, as D&K states, engage in a "remarkable change of 
course" with respect to the legal analysis of a waiver defense. (Appellant's Br. 30.) To 
the contrary, this Court clearly stated that it was following the precedent established in 
Soter's, Inc. v. Deseret Federal Savings & Loan Assoc, 857 P.2d 935 (Utah 1993). D&K 
I, 2003 UT 5, Tf 8 ("Soter's essentially cleaned the slate of the type of categorical waiver 
rule suggested by D&K . . . We decline to depart from our general waiver rule for 
resolution of this case") (internal cites omitted). In light of this Court's express language 
that it was following precedent, D&K's suggestion that this Court "rejected the settled 
rule" is blatantly false. Likewise, D&K's argument that "the world abruptly changed 
when D&K I was decided" (Appellant's Br. 31), is a gross exaggeration. Utah cases prior 
to D&K I suggested the erosion of Woodland Theatres, the case which D&K fatally 
relied upon. See, e.g., Olympus Hills Shopping Ctr., Ltd., 889 P.2d at 461 (holding that 
acceptance of a rent payment "is just one fact to consider in determining whether there 
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was a waiver"). D&K's decision to also argue and bring an estoppel defense shows that 
it was attempting to argue alternative theories to waiver in any instance. 
In short, D&K attempts to stretch the meaning of "a substantial change in 
governing law" beyond feasibility. Followed to its logical conclusion, D&K's argument 
would give litigants a "second bite at the apple" every time an appellate court disagreed 
with a litigant's interpretation of the law. Accordingly, the Court should reject D&K's 
argument that there was a "substantial change in governing law" sufficient to warrant 
reopening the trial court's summary judgment decision. 
ii. Inadequate Briefing 
D&K also raises the unusual argument that its total failure to brief substantial 
compliance somehow justifies reconsideration of the trial court's summary judgment 
decision. (Appellant's Br. 30.) D&K's argument is nonsensical. Because substantial 
compliance is an affirmative defense, D&K bore the burden of raising and arguing this 
defense to the trial court. See Fibro Trust, Inc. v. Brahman Fin., Inc., 1999 UT 13, f 17 
n.8, 974 P.2d 288 (holding that the defendant bears the burden of proving each element of 
its affirmative defenses). One of the most rudimentary principles of modern civil 
procedure is that a party cannot merely rely on its pleadings to defeat summary judgment, 
and, when faced with such a motion, must demonstrate why its pleadings protect the party 
from judgment. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e). Simply put, D&K failed to meet this burden. 
By contrast, in Trembly, the Utah Court of Appeals explained that a court can consider 
whether "an issue was inadequately briefed when first considered by the court" in 
deciding whether to reconsider a prior summary judgment ruling, 884 P.2d at 1311 
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(emphasis added), suggesting that the issue must actually be raised. Because substantial 
compliance was never raised here, this case does not present the type of situation that 
should warrant reconsideration under the "inadequate briefing" factor. 
D&K claims that its failure to brief substantial compliance should be excused 
because it thought its waiver defense would be dispositive under its interpretation of the 
case law. To be sure, D&K erroneously interpreted the case law on waiver. However, 
this does not excuse D&K's failure to raise a substantial compliance argument. See Hart 
v. Salt Lake County Comm 'n, 945 P.2d 125, 135 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (holding that a 
party may not be excused from its failure to argue a defense "based on its erroneous 
interpretation of. . . case law" and affirming the trial court's decision to deny the party's 
motion to reconsider). And again, query why D&K briefed estoppel if it truly believed 
waiver was dispositive. 
Undoubtedly, the "inadequate briefing" factor under Trembly is not meant to 
rescue litigants who fail to carry their burden of supporting their arguments with adequate 
briefing. To the contrary, courts routinely refuse to consider arguments that are 
unsupported by legal analysis or authority. E.g., Jensen v. Sawyers, 2005 UT 81, f 61, 
130 P.3d 325. Here, Rule 54(b) should not be used as a means for rescuing D&K from 
its failure to timely raise a substantial compliance argument. 
iii. Manifest Injustice & Need to Correct Error 
In arguing that the trial court should have granted its Motion to Reconsider on the 
grounds of "manifest injustice," D&K essentially argues that enforcement of the 
forfeiture provision of the Lease is unconscionable. D&K's argument is untenable at 
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best, cf. Mower v. Jorgensen, 2006 UT App 329 (holding that enforcement of a liquidated 
damages provision in a contract would not work a "manifest injustice" under "basic 
principles of freedom of contract"), and has already been rejected by this Court, see D&K 
I, 2003 UT 5, Tf 11 (enforcing the forfeiture provision of the Lease "is not 
unconscionable"). 
As a general rule, an appellate court will not find "manifest injustice" to be present 
unless the trial court committed plain error. Jensen 2005 UT 81, j^ 61 , . Accordingly, the 
party moving for reconsideration on the grounds of manifest injustice must show three 
elements: (1) the demonstration of error; (2) a qualitative showing that the error was 
plain, manifest, or obvious to the trial court; and (3) evidence that the error affected the 
substantial rights of a party. Id. 
Here, the trial court hardly committed "plain error" in refusing to alter its summary 
judgment ruling on the basis of D&K's substantial compliance defense when the facts 
and the law demonstrate that D&K waived that defense. Cf. State v. Alfatlawi, 2006 UT 
App 511, Tf 26, 153 P.3d 804 ("under the invited error doctrine a party on appeal cannot 
take advantage of an error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into 
committing the error."). Simply put, it was not plain error for the trial court to refuse to 
revisit an argument that was waived. 
4. The Trial Court Did Not Err In Concluding That D&K Failed To 
Present Evidence Of Substantial Compliance. 
D&K also argues that it presented sufficient facts to support a finding of 
substantial compliance, relying on the Utah Court of Appeals case, Beus v. Cache 
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County, 1999 UT App 134. Even if this Court were to conclude that D&K did not waive 
its substantial compliance argument and reach the question of whether D&K presented 
sufficient facts to support such a defense, the Court should reject D&K's argument. 
In fact, in D&K I, this Court already rejected D&K's proposed defense. There, 
this Court expressly rejected D&K's argument that IHC should be "equitably estopped" 
from terminating the Lease on the same argument that D&K now makes under its 
"substantial compliance" theory. In its current brief, D&K claims that substantial 
compliance is a defense to forfeiture because the adverse consequences that it will suffer 
if the Lease is terminated are outweighed by the damages suffered by IHC due to D&K's 
default. (Appellant's Br. 33-35.) In D&K I, D&K similarly argued that "equity and good 
conscience should preclude IHC from forfeiting the Lease based on the late payment of 
March rent," (Appellant's D&K I Br. 39, Oct. 31, 2001) and that "Utah law 
acknowledges that a landlord may be precluded from strictly enforcing lease payment 
deadlines by its continued acceptance of late rent," (id. at n.14 (citing Living Scriptures, 
Inc. v. Kudlik, 890 P.2d 7 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)). In ruling on D&K's estoppel argument, 
this Court explicitly stated, "Permitting IHC to enforce the forfeiture provision of the 
written lease after D&K's failure to pay rent following a one-month acquiescence in late 
payment is not unconscionable." 2003 UT 5 at f^ 11. 
Moreover, numerous Utah cases have affirmed the right of a landlord to insist on 
strict compliance with the requirement to pay rent in accordance with the terms of a lease 
agreement, and have allowed forfeiture of a lease based on the simple failure of the tenant 
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to pay rent. E.g., Living Scriptures, Inc., 890 P.2d at 10-11; Olympus Hills, 889 P.2d at 
461. 
In sum, D&K's substantial compliance argument can fairly be construed as 
nothing other than an impermissible attempt to seek a second chance to present a defense 
that it could have, but did not, present to the trial court. See, e.g., Slattery v. Covey & 
Co., Inc., 909 P.2d 925, 928 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) ("appellate review is not intended to 
grant litigants a second chance to present their case . . . [T]his rule is not only reasonable, 
but necessary, if litigation is ever to come to an end.") Accordingly, so that this litigation 
might properly come to an end, this Court should hold that D&K waived its substantial 
compliance defense and did not preserve it for appeal. In addition, the Court should 
affirm the trial court's decision to refuse to revisit its grant of summary judgment in favor 
of IHC on the forfeiture issue. The trial court was under no obligation to consider an 
affirmative defense that D&K waived. Finally, even if the Court reaches the merits of 
D&K's substantial compliance argument, the Court should reject it outright because it 
directly contradicts this Court's ruling in D&K I. 
D&K invites this Court to issue an opinion which will be cited by litigants for 
years to come as the case standing for the proposition that a defense is not waived even it 
is brought up for the first time after judgment has been issued. For the numerous reasons 
set forth above, the Court should decline to do so. 
3. The Trial Court Properly Granted IHC Its Attorneys' Fees Because the 
Present Action was Brought "Under the Lease." 
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In appealing the trial court's award of attorneys' fees to IHC, D&K argues that 
there was no legal basis for the trial court to award attorneys' fees to IHC because IHC 
terminated the Lease with D&K effective as of its 1998 Termination Notice , thereby 
eliminating the Lease provision through which IHC could recover its attorneys' fees. 
(Appellant's Br. at 35-38.) D&K's argument is flawed. 
At the hearing on IHC's Motion for Attorneys' Fees, the trial court found that the 
Lease entitled the prevailing party to any action brought during the "term" of the Lease to 
recover its attorneys' fees. The trial court then found that IHC's termination of the Lease 
was effective on April 15, 1998 when it sent the Termination Notice to D&K. (R. 1374.) 
Based on that language, the trial court speculated whether IHC brought this action after 
the "term of lease ended." (Id.) It invited further briefing from the parties. (Id.) After 
additional briefing by the parties, the trial court determined that this action was brought 
"during the term of the lease" because, until Judge Livingston ruled that IHC was entitled 
to terminate the Lease, the Lease was still in effect.16 (R. 1385-86.) 
16
 D&K complains that the trial court issued "inconsistent rulings" during the 
process. (Appellant's Br. at 38-41.) Ironically, D&K argues that the trial court's change 
of position violated the law of the case doctrine. (Id. at 40.) This argument is 
inconsistent with its argument earlier in its brief that the trial court was free to revisit a 
prior ruling with respect to substantial compliance without violating the law of the case 
doctrine. (Id. at 29.) Moreover, the procedural history illustrates the thoughtfulness of 
the trial court in this matter. The trial court speculated whether declaring the tenancy 
forfeited as of the date of Termination Notice may invalidate the claim for attorneys' 
fees. (R. 1374.) It asked for supplemental briefing on this point. (Id.) After receiving 
the supplemental briefing and again convening oral argument, the trial court concluded 
that its initial impression was incorrect and IHC was entitled to attorneys' fees. (R. 1385-
86.) This history shows careful deliberation rather than reversible error and is precisely 
the type of situation where reconsideration is warranted, in contrast to D&K's substantial 
compliance argument. 
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The trial court was correct in ruling that IHC is entitled to attorneys' fees under 
the Lease. The Lease specifically provides the landlord with the right to any fees 
necessary to enforce the Lease. (R. 20.) It is undisputed that D&K breached the Lease 
by failing to pay March 1998 rent. (Appellant's Br. at 5; Fact 9; R. 120.) It is also 
undisputed that D&K's breach triggered IHC's right to terminate the Lease. (See Fact 7.) 
In turn, this triggered D&K's obligation to leave the premises. (Id. "In the event of such 
termination, Tenant agrees to immediately surrender possession of the Demised 
Premises.") D&K refused to honor IHC's Termination Notice, requiring IHC to bring 
this action. Therefore, this action is an action to enforce D&K's obligation under the 
Lease to vacate the premises. IHC prevailed in this action to enforce its forfeiture 
remedy under the Lease. (Order, July 29, 2004; R. 1100-01.) Accordingly, IHC is 
entitled to attorneys' fees under the Lease. 
The trial court further concluded, correctly, that there could be no other reasonable 
interpretation. Indeed, to hold otherwise would prevent a landlord from simultaneously 
exercising its rights to terminate a lease and enforce an attorneys' fees provision. 
Normally, following the expiration of a lease term, a landlord could bring an action for 
trespass and unlawful detainer and, by statute, gain attorneys' fees for the tenant's refusal 
to depart the premises. However, in this matter, the trial court stayed execution of the 
judgment, which precluded IHC from taking advantage of that statute. (R. 685-89.) In 
other respects, the stay required IHC to act as an ongoing landlord. For example, IHC 
continues to be required to provide utilities to the building so that D&K may remain in 
business. The stay also requires IHC to provide parking for D&K's customers. It would 
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be wholly unfair and inequitable for D&K to insist that, during this forced tenancy, IHC 
has all of the obligations, but none of the benefits, of a landlord as set forth in the Lease. 
Under D&K's interpretation of the attorneys' fee provisions, D&K would have the ability 
to demand performance from IHC in every aspect of the Lease, such as providing 
parking, utilities, and the like, but IHC is not entitled to the benefit of the Lease's 
attorneys' fee provision. Simply stated, D&K cannot have it both ways. 
4. The Amount of Attorneys' Fees Was Just and Reasonable. 
D&K next argues that the amount of attorneys' fees awarded by the trial court to 
IHC was improper. (Appellant's Br. at 40-48.) D&K argues both that IHC did not 
provide enough detail to justify the award {id. at 42), and that IHC provided too much 
information and did not adequately segregate time entries by subject matter to make it 
more easily objected to by D&K {id. at 47). 
Determining the reasonableness of an award of attorneys' fees lies within the 
sound discretion of the trial court. R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook, 2002 UT 11, \ 20, 40 P.3d 
1119. Accordingly, the trial court's award should be affirmed unless D&K can show that 
it was clearly erroneous. Id. at fflf 19-20. As a general rule, a trial court does not commit 
clear error if it awards a fee based on consideration of four factors: (1) what legal work 
was actually performed; (2) how much of the work performed was reasonably necessary 
to adequately prosecute the matter; (3) whether the attorney's billing rate is consistent 
with the rates customarily charged in the locality for similar services; and (4) whether 
circumstances require consideration of additional factors. Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 
764 P.2d 985, 990 (Utah 1988). 
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Here, the entirety of Volume 6 of the trial court record is devoted to the sole issue 
of attorneys' fees. Approximately 300 pages in the record are devoted to briefing, 
affidavits, interim rulings by the trial court, and other papers devoted exclusively to the 
topic of propriety, reasonableness, and amount of attorneys' fees and costs. (R. 1385-
1663.) For eleven full months, the parties addressed no issue other than attorneys' fees 
before the trial court. To now argue that IHC did not provide enough information or 
marshal sufficient evidence to support the attorneys' fees it expended is, to say the least, 
a stretch. 
An important point completely glossed over by D&K is its complete failure, 
despite repeated promises to the trial court, to raise any specific or concrete objection to 
the fees sought. IHC first moved for an award of attorneys' fees on August 25, 2005. (R. 
1200-07.) After months of briefing and argument on whether any fees would be awarded 
at all, IHC filed its Affidavit of Attorneys' Fees and Verified Memorandum of Costs on 
July 10, 2006.17 (R. 1388-1477.) D&K sought and obtained an extension of time from 
IHC to respond to IHC's Affidavit. (R. 1481, J^ 3.) Nearly one month later, on August 8, 
2006, D&K filed a motion for an additional extension of time to allow it even more time 
to respond to the voluminous papers filed, demonstrating the history of attorneys' fees 
accumulated by IHC. (R. 1480-83.) On August 21, 2006, a full month and a half after 
IHC filed its Affidavit of Attorneys' Fees and Costs, D&K finally filed a response. (R. 
The trial court indicated and IHC agreed that until the trial court actually 
awarded attorneys' fees it would be premature for IHC to file an affidavit of specific 
attorneys' fees and costs. 
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1485-96.) However, that response was nearly devoid of any concrete objections. The 
trial court made a specific finding in a minute entry dated August 30, 2006 that: 
[D&K's] response, as Plaintiff points out, is an attack on Plaintiffs failure 
to allocate fees incurred on matters on which Plaintiff prevailed. While 
allocation is the test of the party claiming fees, I agree with Plaintiff that 
the argument in the context of this case is disingenuous. Defendant spent 
weeks preparing a response, but it's submission made little effort to identify 
issues and/or fees for which Plaintiff should not be compensated, and none 
of the criticisms that were included make reference to Plaintiffs detailed 
billing records. (R. 1503) (Emphasis added.) 
The trial court found IHC's submission detailed. (Id.) In that same ruling, though, the 
trial court noted that in order to comply with the analytical framework in Bracken, it 
would require IHC to resubmit a revised affidavit of fees, removing some of the fees 
sought on matters on which it found IHC had not prevailed (e.g., supplemental pleading 
on lease term, etc.). (R. 1504.) 
Thereafter, on September 12, 2006, IHC filed its second Affidavit of Attorneys 
Fees and Memorandum of Costs. (R. 1506-99.) D&K filed a response to the second 
affidavit a mere eight days later, again without providing any concrete objections to 
specific time entries or categories of times billed, other than several which were already 
stipulated or ruled upon by the trial court. (R. 1600-07.) Following briefing by the 
parties, the trial court issued another written order. (R. 1614-15.) In that order, the trial 
court expressly articulated that it was following the analytical framework laid out in 
Bracken and Rule 1.5 of the Utah Code of Professional Responsibility. (R. 1614.) The 
trial court then made several factual findings. First, it dealt with the average hourly rate 
over the numerous years this case has been litigated. (Id.) The trial court made an 
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express finding that the resulting average rate of $191.35 per hour charged by IHC's 
counsel was lower than current market rates and was "clearly reasonable." (Id.) The trial 
court then made the express finding that even though this is an eviction matter, "it is a 
commercial eviction, with a great deal at stake, and the litigation has been both complex 
and very aggressively contested." (R. 1615.) Significantly, the trial court noted, "in the 
absence of specific challenges to tasks and/or time spent, I do not find that there is any 
substantial basis to challenge the total fee in light of the result." (Id.) Simply put, IHC 
briefed why its fees were incurred and why they were reasonable; D&K failed to rebut 
those arguments. 
Additionally, the trial court made numerous discounts to the attorneys' fees IHC 
sought. The actual value of services that IHC received up to the point of the first 
Affidavit, based on counsels' standard rates, was $427,518.00. (R. 1392.) A discount of 
$91,205.96 was applied to those fees because IHC's counsel provided that discount to 
IHC, which the court properly passed on to D&K. (Id.) IHC then sought attorneys' fees 
through May 2006 of $336,312.04. (R. 1393.) After an additional four months'worth of 
briefing and argument (which generated additional attorneys' fees), the trial court 
ultimately awarded a total of only $303,514.59 to IHC. (R. 1615.) That is, the trial court 
had disallowed approximately $40,000.00 worth of fees sought by IHC based upon the 
findings of the court that the fees sought were not expressly related to matters on which 
IHC prevailed. 
This procedural history is in stark contrast to the story painted by D&K in its brief. 
The trial court did explicitly apply the legal standard set forth in Bracken for awarding 
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attorneys' fees. (R. 1614.) The trial court spent months asking for resubmissions of 
affidavits of fees and costs and gave D&K two separate opportunities to file objections to 
those affidavits. The trial court carefully evaluated all of the evidence in determining a 
reasonable award. There is no basis to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion. 
D&K, unhappy with the fact that it failed to articulate any reason why the fees sought by 
IHC were not reasonable, cannot show that the trial court committed patent error. See 
Bracken, 764 P.2d at 989 (holding that an appellate court should not disturb a trial court's 
findings and judgment regarding a reasonable award of attorneys' fees absent "patent 
error or clear abuse of discretion"). 
VII. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, IHC asks this Court to uphold the trial court's ruling 
granting IHC summary judgment on the issue of forfeiture and to affirm the trial court's 
award of attorneys' fees to IHC. 
DATED this fw day of May, 2007. 
STOEL RIVES LLP 
JD. Matthew Moscdh 
Lauren A. Shurman 
Attorneys for Appellee 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IHC HEALTH SERVICES, 
Plaintiff, 
v 
D & K MANAGEMENT, INC., 
Defendant. 
HEARING ON MOTIONS MAY 26,2004 
BEFORE 
THE HONORABLE ROBERT K. HILDER 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
JUN 1 ! 2004 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
By. 
Deputy Clerk 
CAROLYN ERICKSON, CSR 
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIBER 
1775 East Ellen Way FILED 
Sandy, Utah 84092 UTAH APPELLATE COURT^ 
801-523-1186 
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i JAO 
have come across the bench, that it is — I mean it's very clear 
that until you have a final order - put it this way. Only 
final orders are executable. Also, necessarily, only final 
orders, unless some exception of the rules apply, only final 
orders are appealable. So they would not be entitled to 
immediate possession of the property unless this Court rules 
that the order which grants forfeiture is a final order. So 
with that premise — 
THE COURT: So you'll bow to that, is that you 
believe there's common facts underlying the breach-of-contract 
damage claim? 
MR. BRONSON: Yes, your Honor. And then with that 
premise then we necessarily go to Rule 54 (b), which is one of 
the exceptions to a standard historical final-order rule, and 
whether or not this is an issue, this is an order that can be 
certifiable under 54 (b) as a final order, even though all 
claims in the case are not resolved. And the test under 54(b) 
is the Kennecott case, and the first prong of the Kennecott 
case for finality is whether or not there are overlapping 
facts. 
THE COURT: There are no facts left unless you 
identify some for me, and that's one of my questions for you. 
MR. BRONSON: Okay. 
THE COURT: No facts left that determine possession, 
are there? Only the damages that result from forfeiture of 
1 I staying in possession, 
2 ! MR. BRONSON: I would agree with your Honor that, 
3 i given the Court's ruling, there are no facts left — no facts 
4 | left that have to be decided. There were no facts initially 
i 
5 | with this motion for summary judgment. 
6 THE COURT: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
7 | MR. BRONSON: But given this ruling, there are no 
8 facts that have to be decided for possession. However, there 
9 t are a number of facts, and there are certainly issues that 
10 ' remain, with regard to their damages. 
11 ' THE COURT: Oh, I agree with that. I think we're 
12 differing on that, but while there might have been facts in 
13 common at one point with — unless some of the remaining facts 
14 , can go to the issue of possession, why isn't it a final — why 
15 cannot it not be a final judgment on that issue? 
16 MR. BRONSON: Because Kennecott and its progeny are 
17 very clear that the Supreme Court of Utah has decided, for 
i 
i 
18 i purposes of Utah law, to adopt the Seventh Circuit approach to 
19 I finality and to certifications for 54(b) orders. And that 
i 
i 
20 analysis is that if the underlying facts are the same - not if 
! 
21 the causes of action are different, not if the remedies are 
22 different - but if the underlying facts — and here the 
I 
23 I underlying fact is IHC wants possession of its property and 
24 i wants damages for breach because we remain in possession. 
25 ' That's the underlying -
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CONSENT, RESERVATION OF RIGHTS 
AND 
ESCROW DEPOSIT AGREEMENT 
This Consent, Reservation of Rights and Escrow Deposit Agreement (the "Escrow 
Agreement") is made and entered into as of the 1st day of March, 1999, by IHC HEALTH 
SERVICES, INC., a Utah nonprofit corporation (afflCHS") and D&K MANAGEMENT, 
INC., a Utah corporation ("D&K Management") in connection with that certain Lease 
Agreement dated July 18, 1994 (the aLease Agreement"), by and between IHCHS, as 
successor in interest to Medical Plaza 9400, as landlord, and D&K Management, as tenant. 
Covenants and Understandings 
1. On or about April 14, 1998, IHCHS, by certified mail and hand-delivery, 
caused a Notice of Default and Forfeiture to be sent to D&K Management, the contents of 
which instructed D&K Management that its leasehold tenancy in the real property located on 
or about 5142 South State Street, Murray, Utah (the "Leased Premises") was forfeited due to 
D&K Management's failure to comply with the terms of the Lease Agreement (the "Default 
Letter"). According to the Default Letter, D&K Management was to vacate the Leased 
Premises on or before May 15, 1998. 
2. D&K Management disputes any claim by IHCHS that the Lease Agreement 
has been forfeited. D&K Management also claims, and IHCHS disputes any claims, that 
IHCHS has waived its remedy of forfeiture under the Lease Agreement. D&K Management 
further maintains, and IHCHS disputes, that D&K Management has been and continues to be 
entitled to occupy the Leased Premises pursuant to the terms and conditions of the Lease 
Agreement. 
3. Pending resolution of the above disputes, the parties desire to establish and 
maintain an escrow account with ASSOCIATED TITLE COMPANY, Salt Lake City, Utah 
(the "Escrow Agent"), into which D&K Management will make monthly deposits of any and 
all amounts due and payable pursuant to and in accordance with the terms and conditions of 
the Lease Agreement (individually, an "Escrow Deposit" and, collectively, the "Escrow 
Deposits"). 
4. The parties agree that, by the execution and delivery of this Escrow 
Agreement, IHCHS does not waive its claims of default and/or forfeiture of the Lease 
Agreement against D&K Management by allowing D&K Management to continue to occupy 
the Leased Premises or to make any one or all of the Escrow Deposits, and all of IHCHS' 
claims and assertions against D&K Management, including without limitation those set forth 
in the Default Letter, and against any defenses of D&K Management, whether articulated 
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before or after the date of this Escrow Agreement, are expressly reserved and not waived by 
reason of this Escrow Agreement and shall not in any way be lessened or diminished by 
reason of or in connection with the execution and delivery of this Escrow Agreement. 
5. The parties agree that, by the execution and delivery of this Escrow 
Agreement, D&K Management does not admit IHCHS is entitled to the remedy of forfeiture 
based upon a breach of any term or condition of the Lease Agreement, and all of D&K 
Management's defenses against the claims and assertions of IHCHS, whether articulated 
before or after the date of this Escrow Agreement, are expressly reserved and not waived by 
reason of this Escrow Agreement or otherwise and shall not in any way be lessened or 
diminished by reason of or in connection with the execution and delivery of this Escrow 
Agreement. 
6. The parties agree that making an Escrow Deposit in accordance with the terms 
and conditions of the Lease Agreement shall constitute a tender of rent due and payable 
under the Lease Agreement by D&K Management to IHCHS; provided that the parties 
further agree that any failure of D&K Management to timely make an Escrow Deposit in 
accordance with the terms and conditions of the Lease Agreement shall constitute a breach of 
the terms and conditions of the Lease Agreement; provided further that the parties agree that 
all grace periods allowed by the Lease Agreement shall continue in force and not be waived 
by the execution and delivery hereof. 
7. Within five (5) business days of the full and complete execution of this Escrow 
Agreement, IHCHS shall return to D&K Management all checks tendered by D&K 
Management as monthly lease payments under the Lease Agreement and, pending resolution 
of the above disputes, held by IHCHS, which checks, together with the two (2) checks 
tendered to IHCHS by D&K Management for March 1998 and May 1998 and returned to 
D&K Management1, total FORTY THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY-SIX AND 
60/100 DOLLARS ($40,186.60). The checks (with the corresponding dates of tender) are 
summarized as follows: 
Month Date Tendered Check Amount 
March 1998 April 17, 1998/April 23, 1998 3,608.00 
May 1998 May 1, 1998 3,280.00 
June 1998 May 29, 1998 3,280.00 
1
 D&K Management tendered to IHCHS a check in the amount of $3,608, inclusive 
of a $328 late fee, on April 16, 1998 and, again, on April 23, 1998, for the lease payment 
due under the Lease Agreement for March 1998, and a check in the amount of $3,280 on 
May 1, 1998 for the lease payment due under the Lease Agreement for May 1998. The 
check for $3,608 was returned to D&K Management on April 17, 1998 and, again, on May 
11, 1998, and the check for $3,280 was returned to D&K Management on May 11, 1998. 
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Within ten (10) business days thereafter, D&K Management shall deposit with the 
Escrow Agent an amount equal to the sum of the checks tendered to IHCHS (collectively, the 
"Initial Escrow Deposits"), as specified above, secure an "Acknowledgment and 
Acceptance" thereof from the Escrow Agreement (as a part of this Escrow Agreement) and 
deliver a signed copy of such "Acknowledgment and Acceptance" to IHCHS. Further, from 
and after the date hereof, any and all other amounts due and payable pursuant to and in 
accordance with the terms and conditions of the Lease Agreement shall, pending resolution 
of the above disputes, be deposited with the Escrow Agent and shall constitute and be 
deemed part of the Escrow Deposits. Concurrently with the making of any Escrow Deposit 
(including the Initial Escrow Deposits), D&K Management shall provide written notice to 
IHCHS's counsel of the amount and date of deposit thereof. 
8. The Escrow Agent shall take and hold all Escrow Deposits in an interest-
bearing account. Interest shall accrue and inure to the benefit of IHCHS. Escrow Agent may 
invest the Escrow Deposits during the time it is held hereunder in certificates of deposit 
issued by federally-insured banks, U.S. government securities and in such other investments 
as may be approved by IHCHS from time to time in writing, and all interest earned on the 
Escrow Deposits shall become part of the Escrow Deposits and shall be disbursed by the 
Escrow Agent as part of the Escrow Deposits in accordance with the terms hereof. 
9. The Escrow Agent shall be reimbursed by IHCHS for any expenses, attorneys* 
fees, court costs, taxes, or disbursements reasonably incurred by the Escrow Agent in the 
administration of this Escrow Agreement, which the Escrow Agent, by the execution hereof, 
confirms and agrees shall not exceed, in the aggregate during any twelve (12) month period, 
TWO HUNDRED AND FIFTY NO/100 DOLLARS ($250). The Escrow Agent shall not be 
liable for any action taken or suffered by Escrow Agent in good faith in accordance with the 
advice of its legal counsel. 
10. It is intended by the parties hereto that Escrow Agent's duty shall be solely 
administrative, and regardless of whether or not it has knowledge of any other agreements by 
the parties, the Escrow Agent shall not be bound by any such agreements or the knowledge 
SLC1-44337.5 33566-0013 3 
thereof, but must hold and dispose of the Escrow Deposits solely in accordance with the 
terms of this Escrow Agreement. 
11. The Escrow Agent may resign at any time by notifying the parties and such 
resignation shall become effective on the date of mailing and Escrow Agent shall thereupon 
be relieved of all other responsibilities in relation to this Escrow Agreement, except the 
responsibility to hold the Escrow Deposits until a successor escrow agent is appointed by the 
parties and accepts the appointment or the Escrow Deposits are taken by reason of law or 
action of duly constituted authority, either state or federal. 
12. If at any time Escrow Agent deems itself insecure as to proper methods for 
discharging its duties hereunder, then it is completely discharged of any liability whatsoever 
in this matter if it files an action in a court of competent jurisdiction and tenders or 
surrenders the Escrow Deposits. 
13. The Escrow Agent shall not disburse any part or all of the Escrow Deposits 
until the Escrow Agent receives written authorization from both parties hereto or until the 
Escrow Agent is ordered to do so by a court of competent jurisdiction. The Escrow Agent, 
in connection with any amounts to be disbursed pursuant to this Escrow Agreement, shall 
request instructions for payment from the party entitled thereto or, if no such instructions are 
promptly given, shall make payment to the address of the payee as indicated below or such 
other address as may have been provided by and for any such party. 
(a) If to IHCHS, to: 
IHC HEALTH SERVICES, INC. 
36 South State Street 
21st Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attention: Mr. Everett N. Goodwin, Jr. 
Senior Vice President 
with a copy to: 
Guy P. Kroesche, Esq. 
STOEL RIVES LLP 
201 South Main Street 
Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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(b) If to D&K Management, to 
D&K Management, Inc. 
4255 South 300 West, Suite 6 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Attention: Mr. Kent Bangerter 
President 
with a copy to: 
Michael N. Zundel, Esq. 
JARDINE LINEBAUGH & DUNN 
370 East South Temple 
Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
14. All demands and notices to be given hereunder shall be in writing and shall be 
sent either by the parties or by their respective attorneys who are authorized to do so on their 
behalf, by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, postage prepaid, by 
confirmed facsimile or by hand-delivery, in any case addressed to the party to be notified at 
its address set forth in this Escrow Agreement or to such other address as such party shall 
have specified most recently by like notice. Notices given as provided above shall be 
deemed given three (3) days (excluding Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays) after the date 
so mailed, on the date confirmed facsimile shall be delivered, or the date delivered if hand-
delivered. 
15. This Escrow Agreement shall be construed in accordance with the laws of the 
State of Utah. 
16. This Escrow Agreement shall inure to the benefit of the successors and assigns 
of the parties hereto. 
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this Escrow Agreement is executed and entered into as of 
the date first set forth above. 
IHC HEALTH SERVICES, INC., 
a Utah nonprofit corporation 
r. Senior yiee President 
Dated this day of L. . 1999. 




Dated this [S day of /V^^/^ 1999. 
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1 in contracts. 
2 The Supreme Court in 1983 said, you affirm a portion 
3 of a contract, you affirm the whole. Now, that's—goes all 
4 the way back to 1936, also. So— 
5 THE COURT: Now, did you argue that to the Supreme 
6 Court? 
7 MR. ZUNDEL: Yes, we did. 
8 THE COURT: Then they didn't really say that, did 
9 they, when they discussed waiver? Justice Wilkins, I mean, 
10 that's—wouldn't that make sense, that if that was persuasive 
11 to the Supreme Court, they would have come back and said, 
12 under these facts, one way of raising waiver is you affirm the 
13 part, you affirm the whole? 
14 I mean, it's a great phrase, I like it. But why 
15 didn't they pick it up? 
16 MR. ZUNDEL: I—I think they too—I think they took 
17 the—the—they—they took the largest peg sticking out of the 
18 wall to hang the decision on, which was: You didn't even get 
19 the facts right, Judge. 
20 THE COURT: Uh huh. 
21 MR. ZUNDEL: So, I'm sending it back to you, it is 
22 premature, at best, at best, it's premature. At worst, it's 
23 wrong. 
24 THE COURT: I guess we're reading it differently. 
25 I hear your argument, Mr. Zundel, but I—I am not 
9 
sure that truly, except for at the beginning, you addressed my 
specific question, you've addressed whether a waiver's 
occurred and you made it well, I appreciate it; but if this 
Court was to determine under the undisputed facts that are now 
in the record, that a waiver has not occurred, is there some 
reason under the law of summary judgment, this Court could not 
do that? 
MR. ZUNDEL: Absolutely. Because there are facts in 
the record which look—which addressed in the light most 
favorable to this client of ours—of mine, D & K, show a 
distinct, unequivocal act of waiver, inconsistent with any 
other result, any other intent. 
You know, this idea of corporate intent, let's— 
THE COURT: Uh huh. 
MR. ZUNDEL: I see that—I see that IHC grabs onto 
this, but it doesn't want to acknowledge that, as a 
corporation, it's bound by the acts of its agent. You know, 
it—it talks about in its memoranda on its motion, this 
motion— 
THE COURT: Uh huh. 
MR. ZUNDEL: —it says, you know, we accepted the 
April rent, that should not be held against us because it was 
delivered to our home office, and— 
THE COURT: Well,— 
MR. ZUNDEL: —and we— 
10 
